I’ve some questions about Ghidra released by NSA on Github. And research about it then saw a ycombinator thread for it. That answer was clever and funny.
As title marked, you really okay for just “open source” to trust it?
I’ve some questions about Ghidra released by NSA on Github. And research about it then saw a ycombinator thread for it. That answer was clever and funny.
As title marked, you really okay for just “open source” to trust it?
Ghidra is used by the best and brightest malware inspectors. If it was backdoored, it would have been discovered almost immediately.
The NSA has two conflicting missions, one is to hack everyone, and the other is to protect American networks and interests. Ghidra is from the later, its goal was to make malware analysis cheap and accessible so that more people can investigate and defeat malware.
Can you prove your claim?
That’s the hope. Reality is, these things still happen. Remember that even the extremely secure Linux Kernel was almost, if it was not discovered accidentally and looked into it, hit bey huge backdoor. What makes you so sure that Ghidra developers and inspectors is on the same level?
Go to any cyber security conference. Check out the CTF teams, Ghidra is used everywhere.
Can you prove that there is a backdoor? Remember that it is freely available, and if China, Russia, NK or any other nation state could find a backdoor, they would be shouting it from the rooftops to shame the US.
I dont doubt that the NSA could have seeded a backdoor in an open source project, but I very much doubt they would sign their name to it…
I didn’t say there is, I only ask for proofing your point. Remember: Not able to find anything is not the proof of absence. You can only proof something you can find. All I am saying is, if even Linux Kernel ALMOST got hid by a backdoor that was extremely sophisticated, it could happen to Ghidra as well. I’m not saying Ghidra is unsecure or anything like that.
Then they would most likely use it to their advantage without telling anyone. Shaming a nation is not as lucrative like
abusing a backdoor.Only true if they can abuse the backdoor, if its tied to NSA infrastructure (which a competent backdoor would be), they couldn’t use it. There is also precedence, the Germans didnt hesitate to publicise that Angela Merkel’s phone was hacked, they could have used the malware to feed false information instead. Stuxnet was exposed to embarrass the US/Israel.
Cyber security companies would also have no qualms about publicising it. Finding a NSA backdoor would put them on the map, and they have no use for a backdoor.
Also just want to add to your points that the NSA didn’t have to admit they developed this. Putting their name to it basically guaranteed that everyone would pour through the code and assume the worst. So it get hyper scrutinzed. So if they had wanted to put a back door in it they would have released it without saying they made it.
Exactly!
for intended bugdoor?
I dont know what you mean by that. Do you mean that the NSA would leave a bug in accidentally? Or intentionally?
Accidentally is definitely plausible, they are only human after all.
Intentionally would be incredibly stupid. The offensive side of the NSA spends billions developing malware that can’t be easily found and attributed to them. Inserting one of those malwares into a piece of software they have publically claimed ownership off completely defeats the point. If they wanted to backdoor an open source software, why wouldn’t they do it anonymously…
Even if we take your definitions, they are still conflicting.
Attacking humans means developing malware.
Defending capital means protecting that capital from others malware.
If either of them do their job too well, the other will be failed. That is by definition conflicting.
Just add certain.
Hack certain humans. Protect certain capital
That doesnt change anything about my original point. They are conflicting missions, whether you add certain or not.
And no matter what you call it, backdooring ghidra defeats the point of both, it means no one will use it, which allows malware to run rampant. (Ghidra was released during the height of the cryptolocker craze, it allowed reversing those crypto lockers to be done by anyone, effectively neutering many of them).
And when it gets caught its immediately attributable to the malware division, which they dont want either.
There is zero point backdooring ghidra. Now XZ? *sshole? Thats the level of sophisticated backdoor I would expect from the NSA.