Gaining ground isn’t the same thing as winning, a lesson that the Russians should be all too familiar with, as it’s how they beat the Germans in WW2 (though a more accurate point of comparison would be Germany’s failure against the West in WW1; they held significant ground in France at the time of their surrender. It wasn’t that their lines collapsed or that they were outmanoeuvred on the battlefield; it was their economy that could no longer bear the weight of the war). It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear, and that’s exactly what Ukraine is doing to Russia. This doesn’t mean Ukraine is guaranteed to win, but their success largely depends on the continued support of their allies in Europe and North America. Whereas Russia has no real clear path to success at this point.
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy. Ukraine has gotten too good at entrenching, and is creating deeply layered defences that the Russians have no way to break through in a decisive fashion, and Ukraine is being extremely careful with it’s manpower, whereas Russian continues to waste theirs on pointless attacks and dispersed operations. We’re seeing constant footage and reports of Russian sections consisting of only 2-4 men attacking over open ground with no vehicle support, and getting picked off as they come in by Ukrainian machine gun positions and FPVs. The Russian economy is grinding to a halt under the weight of the war; they held out a lot longer in the face of sanctions than anyone in the West predicted, but the choices they made early on to keep the economy flowing are now turning into major pain points (massive interest rate hikes to control inflation now turning into a serious lack of investment and consumer spending, dumped foreign currency reserves used to float the rouble now leaving them with no fallback for the hard times ahead, etc). Ukraine has developed new long range attack drones that can strike deep into Russia, opening up all of their industry, and particularly their oil refining capabilities, to attack. Russia is so big that they simply cannot defend all of it from aerial attack, and Ukraine’s intel is good enough that they can continually shift their focus to wherever Russia isn’t defending.
This is why Putin is eager to talk peace now. He would love to, as you describe, stop with their current gains. That would actually constitute a win. The longer this goes on for, the worse it gets for Russia, while Ukraine can continue to hold out for as long as we continue to stand with them and keep them supplied. Their manpower losses are serious, but manageable if they continue with their current strategies, and while Russia continues to hammer their infrastructure, Ukraine has superior - and more efficient - air defence and most of their manufacturing happens outside of the country where Russia can’t hit it.
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy.
According to whom?
According to the actual battlefield, Russian doctrine relies on throwing wave after wave of poorly trained criminals and shanghaied DPR/LPR citizens into the machine guns, artillery and drones of the Ukrainians.
Don’t get me wrong, there are massive weaknesses, and we may see Ukraine exploit them. But we aren’t seeing that translate to battlefield success. Putin hasn’t shown any eagerness to talk peace; only the same old “peace” meaning capitulation. He’s been keen on that since the beginning.
Funnily enough, experts on Russian battlefield doctrine. The ones I talked to all work in the CAF, but you’re welcome to search up your own sources on the subject. This guy was the commander of the US armed forces in Europe from 2014 to 2017, so I’d say he probably knows his stuff, and his analysis aligns with that of the experts I’ve spoken with; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qjrYpDDWS4&t=1s
If you’re trying to understand the disconnect between their doctrine and what’s actually playing out on the battlefield, it’s surprisingly simple really. This is what happens when you have an inflexible command structure that relies exclusively on doctrine and rigid adherence to chain of command (eg, individual soldiers are basically just machines to operated by their superiors), mixed with a huge amount of institutional corruption and an unwillingness to report the basic facts of the situation on the ground because it’s politically unfavourable to admit that things aren’t going to plan. The doctrine says “Smash a hole” so they try, and fail, repeatedly to smash that hole. That leads to waves of men being thrown at targets to no effect because if you haven’t smashed the hole you can’t move on to step two, so you just keep on repeating step one.
Gaining ground isn’t the same thing as winning, a lesson that the Russians should be all too familiar with, as it’s how they beat the Germans in WW2 (though a more accurate point of comparison would be Germany’s failure against the West in WW1; they held significant ground in France at the time of their surrender. It wasn’t that their lines collapsed or that they were outmanoeuvred on the battlefield; it was their economy that could no longer bear the weight of the war). It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear, and that’s exactly what Ukraine is doing to Russia. This doesn’t mean Ukraine is guaranteed to win, but their success largely depends on the continued support of their allies in Europe and North America. Whereas Russia has no real clear path to success at this point.
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy. Ukraine has gotten too good at entrenching, and is creating deeply layered defences that the Russians have no way to break through in a decisive fashion, and Ukraine is being extremely careful with it’s manpower, whereas Russian continues to waste theirs on pointless attacks and dispersed operations. We’re seeing constant footage and reports of Russian sections consisting of only 2-4 men attacking over open ground with no vehicle support, and getting picked off as they come in by Ukrainian machine gun positions and FPVs. The Russian economy is grinding to a halt under the weight of the war; they held out a lot longer in the face of sanctions than anyone in the West predicted, but the choices they made early on to keep the economy flowing are now turning into major pain points (massive interest rate hikes to control inflation now turning into a serious lack of investment and consumer spending, dumped foreign currency reserves used to float the rouble now leaving them with no fallback for the hard times ahead, etc). Ukraine has developed new long range attack drones that can strike deep into Russia, opening up all of their industry, and particularly their oil refining capabilities, to attack. Russia is so big that they simply cannot defend all of it from aerial attack, and Ukraine’s intel is good enough that they can continually shift their focus to wherever Russia isn’t defending.
This is why Putin is eager to talk peace now. He would love to, as you describe, stop with their current gains. That would actually constitute a win. The longer this goes on for, the worse it gets for Russia, while Ukraine can continue to hold out for as long as we continue to stand with them and keep them supplied. Their manpower losses are serious, but manageable if they continue with their current strategies, and while Russia continues to hammer their infrastructure, Ukraine has superior - and more efficient - air defence and most of their manufacturing happens outside of the country where Russia can’t hit it.
According to whom?
According to the actual battlefield, Russian doctrine relies on throwing wave after wave of poorly trained criminals and shanghaied DPR/LPR citizens into the machine guns, artillery and drones of the Ukrainians.
Don’t get me wrong, there are massive weaknesses, and we may see Ukraine exploit them. But we aren’t seeing that translate to battlefield success. Putin hasn’t shown any eagerness to talk peace; only the same old “peace” meaning capitulation. He’s been keen on that since the beginning.
Funnily enough, experts on Russian battlefield doctrine. The ones I talked to all work in the CAF, but you’re welcome to search up your own sources on the subject. This guy was the commander of the US armed forces in Europe from 2014 to 2017, so I’d say he probably knows his stuff, and his analysis aligns with that of the experts I’ve spoken with; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qjrYpDDWS4&t=1s
If you’re trying to understand the disconnect between their doctrine and what’s actually playing out on the battlefield, it’s surprisingly simple really. This is what happens when you have an inflexible command structure that relies exclusively on doctrine and rigid adherence to chain of command (eg, individual soldiers are basically just machines to operated by their superiors), mixed with a huge amount of institutional corruption and an unwillingness to report the basic facts of the situation on the ground because it’s politically unfavourable to admit that things aren’t going to plan. The doctrine says “Smash a hole” so they try, and fail, repeatedly to smash that hole. That leads to waves of men being thrown at targets to no effect because if you haven’t smashed the hole you can’t move on to step two, so you just keep on repeating step one.